The Supreme Court/The Supreme Court.iso/pc/ascii/1994/94_941/94_941.zpc

Text File | 1995-01-23 | 11.5 KB | 230 lines

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
WILLIAM DUNCAN, WARDEN v.
 ROBERT E. HENRY
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 94-941.  Decided January 23, 1995

  Per Curiam.
  Respondent, a rector and dean of a church day school,
was tried and convicted in state court of sexually
molesting a 5-year-old student.  At trial, respondent
objected to testimony by the parent of another child who
claimed to have been molested 20 years previously.  His
objection was based on Cal. Evid. Code Ann. 352 (West
1966).  On direct appeal, he pursued his evidentiary
objection and requested the appellate court to find that
the error was a -miscarriage of justice- under the
California Constitution.  California applies this provision
in determining whether or not an error was harmless.
People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 299 P. 2d 243 (1956).
The California Court of Appeal found the error harmless
and affirmed respondent's conviction.  People v. Henry,
No. CR23041 (2d Dist. 1990), App. D to Pet. for Cert. 6.
  Respondent then filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in federal court, alleging that the evidentiary
error amounted to a denial of due process under the
United States Constitution.  The District Court granted
the petition and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed.  Henry v. Estelle, 33 F. 3d 1037 (1994).
The court held that respondent had exhausted his state
remedies even though he had not claimed a violation of
any federal constitutional right in the state proceedings:
-In his direct appeal in state court, Henry did not
label his claim a federal due process violation; he
argued rather that Hackett's testimony was errone-
ously admitted because irrelevant and inflammatory,
and that its admission resulted in a `miscarriage of
justice' under the California Constitution. . . .
However, to state a federal due process claim it is
not necessary to invoke `the talismanic phrase -due
process of law-' or cite `book and verse on the
federal constitution'. . . .-  Id., at 1040 (citations
omitted).
  In Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270, 275 (1971), we
said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that
petitioners -fairly presen[t]- federal claims to the state
courts in order to give the State the -`opportunity to
pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners'
federal rights- (some internal quotation marks omitted).
If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct
alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must
surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are
asserting claims under the United States Constitution.
If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidenti-
ary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due
process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in
state court.  Accord, Anderson v. Harless, 459 U. S. 4
(1982).
  Picard and Harless control the outcome in this case.
Respondent did not apprise the state court of his claim
that the evidentiary ruling of which he complained was
not only a violation of state law, but denied him the due
process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  The failure is especially pronounced in that
respondent did specifically raise a due process objection
before the state court based on a different claim-that
the pleading was uncertain as to when the offense
occurred.  App. D to Pet. for Cert. 8.  The California
Court of Appeal analyzed the evidentiary error by asking
whether its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative
value, not whether it was so inflammatory as to prevent
a fair trial.  33 F. 3d, at 1046.  As recognized by
dissenting Judge Brunetti, those standards are no more
than -'somewhat similar,'- id., at 1047, not -virtually
identical- as claimed by Justice Stevens.  Post, at 6.
Both Picard and Harless emphasized that mere similar-
ity of claims is insufficient to exhaust.  Picard, supra, at
276; Harless, supra, at 6.  The state court, when
presented with respondent's claim of error under the
California Evidentiary Code, understandably confined its
analysis to the application of state law.
  Accordingly, the petition for a writ of certiorari is
granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

                                              Reversed.

  Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg and
Justice Breyer join, concurring in the judgment.
  I concur in the judgment because respondent's -miscar-
riage of justice- claim in state court was reasonably
understood to raise a state law issue of prejudice, not a
federal issue of due process.  Consequently, no federal
claim was -fairly presented to the state courts- within
the meaning of Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270, 275
(1971).

  Justice Stevens, dissenting.
  Today's opinion sets forth a new rule of law that is a
substantial departure from our precedents.  In my
opinion, it is unwise for the Court to announce a new
rule without first hearing argument on the issue.  The
Court's opinion is especially distressing because it
creates an exacting pleading requirement that serves no
legitimate purpose in our habeas corpus jurisprudence.
  In Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 (1971), after full
briefing and argument, the Court issued an opinion
carefully explaining the rule that a state prisoner must
exhaust his state-court remedies before applying for a
federal writ of habeas corpus.  We held that the exhaus-
tion requirement is satisfied when -the federal claim has
been fairly presented to the state courts.-  Id., at 275.
We made it clear, however, that the prisoner need not
place the correct label on his claim, or even cite the
Federal Constitution, as long as the substance of the
federal claim has been fairly presented.
  As we explained: -Obviously there are instances in
which `the ultimate question for disposition,' United
States ex rel. Kemp v. Pate, 359 F. 2d 749, 751 (CA7
1966), will be the same despite variations in the legal
theory or factual allegations urged in its support.  A
ready example is a challenge to a confession predicated
upon psychological as well as physical coercion.-  Id., at
277.  Thus, until today, prisoners have not been re-
quired to exhaust their federal claims -by citing `book
and verse on the federal constitution.'-  Id., at 278
(citation omitted).  Rather, the rule has been simply that
they must present -the substance of a federal habeas
corpus claim . . . to the state courts.-  Ibid.
  Today the Court tightens the pleading screws by
adding the requirement that the state courts -must
surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are
asserting claims under the United States Constitution.-
Ante, at 2.  As support for that proposition the Court
cites Picard and Anderson v. Harless, 459 U. S. 4 (1982),
but neither case is in point.  In the former, the Court
pointed out that the claim asserted in state court-that
an indictment was invalid under Massachusetts
law-was different from the equal protection claim first
raised in federal court; in the latter, the Court carefully
explained why it concluded that the state-law basis for
objecting to a jury instruction differed from the federal
rule announced in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510
(1979).  While I disagreed with the view that Harless'
federal claim had not been fairly presented to the state
courts, see 459 U. S., at 9-12 (dissenting opinion), I
surely did not understand the Court's opinion to hold
that the exhaustion doctrine includes an exact labeling
requirement.
  Nor have the Courts of Appeals demonstrated any
such understanding of Harless or Picard.  To the
contrary, the Circuits have analyzed the exhaustion
question without rigidly insisting that a prisoner invoke
the -talismanic- language of federal law.  See Tamapua
v. Shimoda, 796 F. 2d 261, 263 (CA9 1986); see also,
e.g., Hawkins v. West, 706 F. 2d 437, 439-440 (CA2
1983); Lesko v. Owens, 881 F. 2d 44, 50 (CA3 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U. S. 1036 (1990); West v. Wright, 931
F. 2d 262, 266 (CA4 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 505
U. S. ___ (1992); Satter v. Leapley, 977 F. 2d 1259, 1262
(CA8 1992); Bowser v. Boggs, 20 F. 3d 1060, 1063
(CA10), cert. denied, 513 U. S. ___ (1994); Nichols v.
Sullivan, 867 F. 2d 1250, 1252-1253 (CA10), cert.
denied, 490 U. S. 1112 (1989); Hutchins v. Wainwright,
715 F. 2d 512, 518-519 (CA11 1983), cert. denied, 465
U. S. 1071 (1984).
  The new rule the Court announces today is hypertech-
nical and unwise.  It will prolong litigation without
serving any valid purpose.  The example of a challenge
to a coerced confession cited in Picard, 404 U. S., at
277, illustrates the point.  If a prisoner presents all his
evidence to a state court, and if the standard for judging
the voluntariness of a confession under state law is the
same as under federal law, the state court has had a
fair opportunity to pass on the claim regardless of
whether the prisoner relies on both the state and federal
constitutions or just the former.  If the state courts have
considered and rejected such a claim on state-law
grounds, nothing is to be gained by requiring the
prisoner to present the same claim under a different
label to the same courts that have already found it
insufficient.  The cost of needless litigation is, however,
significant both to the judicial system, see Harless, 459
U. S., at 8 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and to persons like
respondent who are imprisoned despite their meritorious
federal claims.
  In the case before us today, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit carefully analyzed the exhaustion
issue.  On the merits, respondent presented the Court of
Appeals with a federal due process claim, the crux of
which was that the testimony of Thomas Hackett, a
witness for the prosecution, was so inflammatory and
irrelevant as to render his trial fundamentally unfair.
Cf. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62, 75 (1991) (severely
prejudicial evidentiary errors may violate due process).
Respondent had challenged the admission of Hackett's
testimony on direct appeal in state court.  33 F. 3d
1037, 1040 (CA9 1994).  To be sure, he had cited only
state law.  Ibid.  As carefully explained by the Court of
Appeals, however, the standards for addressing respond-
ent's state-law claims were virtually identical to those
applied in federal court on habeas review.  Id., at
1041-1042.  Thus, after full discussion of the issue, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that respondent had exhausted
his claims.
  Judge Brunetti dissented from the majority's analysis,
but on a ground that is entirely different from that
advanced by this Court in what appears to be its
holding.  He did not merely argue that there was no
exhaustion because the prisoner had failed to cite the
Federal Constitution.  Rather, he carefully explained his
view that the federal claim differed from the state claim
because it was governed by the harmless-error standard
in Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967), rather
than a California standard similar to Brecht v. Abra-
hamson, 507 U. S. ___ (1993).  I am inclined to believe
that the majority had the better of the argument
because the Brecht standard would apply in the federal
habeas proceeding.  But the important point of the
dissent is that, like the majority, it correctly perceived
the exhaustion question as whether the claim had been
fairly presented to the state courts, not whether re-
spondent had attached the correct label.
  This Court should not abruptly terminate thoughtful
debate among conscientious Circuit judges by summarily
announcing a new rule.  If we are to depart from the
standard set forth in Picard and Harless, we should do
so only after thorough consideration with the benefit of
full briefing and argument.  I respectfully dissent.